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EXCLUSION FROM PRIVATE ASSOCIATIONS
STUDENTS of politics and law have long recognized the public influence of
private associations as well as their immense power over members of the as-
sociations.' However, there is considerable disagreement among commenta-
tors about what role, if any, courts ought to play in regulating the exercise
of either the influence or the power.2 Generally, judicial action concerning
private associations has been limited to reviewing the society's duties towards
its members.3 In suits involving non-members seeking admission, only a few
courts have ordered a private association to admit an excluded applicant. 4
Review of the internal actions of private associations raises many problems,
for the interests of an excluded applicant must be balanced against the values
of free association, group autonomy and private ordering of society. In each
case a court must determine whether the particular association is a proper
subject of judicial review; whether the harm to the excluded applicant justifies
intervention; and whether there are suitable standards to test the validity
of the group's action. This Note will examine one type of private organization
the professional association 5 - in an attempt to isolate some of the factors
1. One of the earliest comments on the importance of private associations was II Dn
TocQuEvILxL DEmocAcY iN AmaIcA (chap. V) (1862). For examples of other works
by political scientists see, Mi.s, WHrrE COLLAR (1951); TRumAN, THE GoVRM._TAL
PROCESS (1955). In the legal field the classic discussion is Chafee, Tie Internal Affairs
of Association Not for Profit, 43 HAhv. L. REv. 993 (1930). For a complete survey of the
"law of private associations" see Developments in the Law - Judicial Control of Actions
of Private Associations, 76 HARv. L. REv. 983 (1963). Most other studies have concen-
trated on particular associations. See, e.g., Note, The American Medical Association:
Power, Purposes, and Politics in Organized Medicine, 63 YALE I.J. 933 (1954).
2. Some commentators would have courts review the actions of every association
strong enough to affect a large number of people. See, e.g., MILLER, PxvART GovEa. tNTs
AND THE CoNsTIuTioN 12-14 (1959); Berle, Constitutional Limitation on Corporate
Activity - Protection of Personal Rights front Invasion Through Economic Power, 100
U. Ps. L. REv. 933 (1952). Others emphasize the importance of group autonomy and ad-
vocate judicial intervention only under special circumstances which pose a particular threat
to democratic government. See, e.g., Summers, Democracy in Private Groups and Democ-
racy in Government at 5 (1960) (unpublished speech) ; Chafee, supra note 1.
3. See Developments in the Law, supra note 1, at 1006-37.
4. See Falcone v. County Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A2d 791 (1961), afirming
62 N.J. Super. 184, 162 A.2d 324 (1960). Blende v. County Medical Soc'y, 96 Ariz. 240,
393 P.2d 926 (1964). For critical comment see, Note, Judicially Compelled Admission to
Medical Societies: The Falcone Case, 75 H,xv. L Rm,. 1186 (1962); Note, 15 RUTGERs
L. REv. 327 (1961).
5. Several characteristics of professional associations make them of particular concern
to our government and legal system. Professional service is extremely important to society,
yet the general public has little means of judging the competence of this service. Thus,
professional associations, by promoting higher standards of competence and ethics, are
performing an important public service. This frequently results in the delegation of public
powers to these associations. See, infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text. It is important
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which might justify intervening in exclusion disputes. Also the Note will sug-
gest a workable standard for the courts to apply.
Historically, courts have treated professional associations as private, volun-
tary groups, and have been reluctant to intervene in their affairs.0 This policy
of non-interference has been more pronounced in cases involving exclusion
from membership rather than expulsion from an association. In expulsion
cases, courts have justified intervention on the grounds that the expelled
member has been deprived of "property rights" or that the association's actions
were in breach of a contractual agreement between the member and the society.
However, an individual cannot have a property right in an organization of
that the associations exercise these powers in a manner consonant with the public's welfare,
The association is also important to the members of the profession:
[A] profession can only be said to exist when there are bonds between the prac-
titioners, and these bonds can take but one shape - that of a formal organization,
Just as a number of families in primitive society do not form a state, so a number
of men, though they perform similar functions, do not make a profession if they
remain in isolation.
CARR-SAUNDERS, THE PROrzSsioNs 248 (1933). It is often through membership in a pro-
fessional association that the practitioner achieves recognition and status, two very in-
portant elements of professional success. See BLAu & Scorr, FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS 62
(1962). The association may also have substantial economic power. See note 18 inlra and
accompanying text.
Almost all professional associations are organized on state and national levels, and
many have local chapters. Membership at one level does not necessarily entail member-
ship at another level. The primary focus of this Note will be upon membership at state
or local levels, for at these levels the individual practitioner is most affected by the powers
of professional organizations and the closest connections between the society and govern-
ment exist.
The following professions - all of which have well-organized state and national asso-
ciations open generally to all members of the profession - have been considered in prep-
aration of this Note:
a) accountants e) engineers
b) architects f) osteopaths
c) attorneys g) pharmacists
d) dentists h) physicians
This is by no means an exhaustive list of occupations entitled to be called professions,
and the arguments presented in this Note may apply equally well to professions not in-
cluded in this list as well as to other private organizations which exercise powers similar
to those of professional associations.
6. For a full discussion of the reasons for this policy see Chafee, suspra note 1, at
1021-23.
7. As examples of the "property" theory see State ex rel. Waring v. Medical Soc'y,
38 Ga. 608 (1869); Dawkins v. Antrobus, 17 Ch. D. 615 (1881). As examples of the
"contract" theory see Smith v. County Medical Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 263, 120 P2d 874 (1942) ;
Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931). Both of these theories have been
extensively criticized, and the absence of a "contractual" or "property" right does not
appear to be a valid reason for non-intervention in exclusion disputes. See Note, 15 RuT-
GERS L. Rxv. 327, 330-32 (1961) ; Chafee, supra note 1, at 1001-07; Devclopments il the
Law, supra note 1, at 999, 1002.
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which he is not a member 8 Nor can he establish the existence of a contractual
relationship which will protect him. Generally there has been no legal remedy
available to the practitioner denied admission to a professional society. Such
associations have been free to refuse admission on any grounds. They are
treated by the courts no differently from country clubs, college fraternities
or the Masons. The typical judicial attitude is expressed in Harris v. Thomas 0
which involved the exclusion of an osteopath from a local medical society in
Texas. The court stated that:
A voluntary association has the power to enact laws governing the ad-
mission of members.. .. Membership therein is a privilege which the
society may accord or withhold at its pleasure, with which a court of
equity will not interfere, even though the arbitrary rejection of the can-
didate may prejudice his material interests. 10
Only in certain special circumstances have the courts made exceptions to
this general policy. Where the state requires membership in a professional
society as a prerequisite to practice, some courts have compelled the admission
of duly licensed members of the profession.' Furthermore, a few state courts
have intervened when there was a showing that the association's actions were
designed solely to eliminate competition in violation of state antitrust lavh?
However, state antitrust laws afford relief only in limited circumstances, and
at best provide an infrequent basis for intervention in exclusion cases.10
8. Courts have usually used the term "property interest" in connection with a right to
use the association's physical property or to share in the society's assets in the event of
dissolution. See, e.g, Davis v. Scher, 356 Mich. 291, 97 N.V.2d 137 (1959); Stein v.
Marks, 44 Misc. 140,89 N.Y. Supp. 921 (Sup. Ct. 1904).
9. 217 S.W. 1068 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); accord, Medical Soc'y v. Walker, 245 Ala.
135, 16 So. 2d 321 (1944).
10. 217 S.W. at 1076-77.
11. See People ex re. Bartlett v. Medical Soc'y, 32 N.Y. 187 (1865).
12. See, e.g., Group Health Co-op v. County Medical Soc'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 237 P.2d
737 (1951) ; Tatldn v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 2d 745, 326 P.2d 201 (Dist. Ct. App.
1958). See, contra, Levin v. Sinai Hosp., 186 Md. 174, 46 A.2d 298 (Ct App. 1946).
13. Generally, courts have limited application of anti-trust laws to cases where the
AMA 'was trying to destroy a group-health plan. See, e.g., Group Health Co-op v. County
Medical Soe'y, supra note 12. Most anti-trust actions have been brought under state anti-
trust laws because of the difficulty of proving a violation of the Sherman Act. In American
Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943), an action brought under § 3 of the
Sherman Act, the Court enjoined the association's activity, but avoided ruling on whether
the Sherman Act would apply to professions outside of the District of Columbia. However,
in United States v. State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952), the Court held that the
practice of medicine could not be covered by the Sherman Act since it did not involve
interstate commerce. (This would seem to apply to other professions as well.) Consequent-
ly, the Court refused to compel admission into the society. Another obstacle to use of the
Sherman Act is the difficulty of proving a conspiracy or injury to the public. See, e.g,
Riggall v. County Medical Soc'y, 249 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 954
(1958). For a general discussion of the application of anti-trust laws to medical associa-
tions see Comment, 22 U. CHL L. REV. 694 (1955).
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The New Jersey Supreme Court, in the case of Falcone v. Medical SoC'y,1 4
was the first court to break completely from the traditional judicial approach
toward professional societies. Dr. Falcone, a graduate of the Philadelphia
College of Osteopathy, passed the New Jersey State Medical Examination,
and was licensed to "practice Medicine and Surgery in the State of New
Jersey."' 5 The Philadelphia College of Osteopathy offered a complete medical
course and was accredited by the New Jersey State Board of Medical Examin-
ers, but not by the American Medical Association (AMA). Dr. Falcone later
acquired a full medical degree, based partially on his previous education, from
the AMA-accredited University of Milan in Italy. After starting practice in
New Jersey, and becoming a staff member of several hospitals there,10 Dr.
Falcone applied for admission to the Middlesex County Medical Society. He
was denied membership because he was a Doctor of Osteopathy, not of Medi-
cine. The Society considered his degree from Milan unsatisfactory since that
institution had given credit for his prior study. He was unable to continue
serving on the hospitals' staffs because the AMA, by threatening to withdraw
accreditation, forced the hospitals to hire only members of local medical so-
cieties. Since Dr. Falcone required hospital facilities in order to maintain his
practice, he alleged that his rejection from the Society severely limited his
professional practice, and that consequently he would suffer serious economic
hardship.
The Superior Court of Middlesex County ordered Dr. Falcone admitted
into the society.1 7 In affirming this decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court
recognized the traditional reluctance of courts to interfere in the affairs of
private associations, but found that the economic hardship caused by the so-
ciety's action justified the lower court's decision.18 The Supreme Court agreed
that the AMA's stranglehold over accredited hospitals gave the Middlesex
society a monopoly over hospital staffing. Consequently, the Court considered
it unreasonable to accept the traditional categorization of the medical society
as a voluntary association, since membership in it was an economic necessity.10
After a further finding that Dr. Falcone's exclusion bore "no relation to the
advancement of medical science or the elevation of public standards,"2 0 the
Court held that the society's action "[ran] counter to the public policy of
our State"2 ' by reducing the value of Dr. Falcone's license.
22
14. 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961), affirming 62 N.J. Super. 184, 162 A.2d 324
(1960).
15. 34 N.J. 582, 584, 170 A2d 791, 793. The facts of this case are set forth at 34 N.J.
at 584-87, 170 A.2d at 793-96.
16. Dr. Falcone had been accepted to these hospital staffs while a provisional member
of the Middlesex Society. 34 N.J. at 586, 170 A.2d at 793.
17. 62 N.J. Super. 184, 162 A.2d 324 (1960).
18. 34 N.J. at 592, 170 A.2d at 796-97.
19. 34 N.J. at 596, 170 A.2d at 799.
20. 34 N.J. at 598, 170 A2d at 800.
21. Ibid.
22. 34 N.J. at 597, 598, 170 A.2d at 799, 800.
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Most commentators criticized the Falcone dedsionF3 although they conceded
that plaintiff's substantial economic injury provided some justification for the
court's intervention. 4 It is submitted, however, that not only was Falcone
decided correctly, but that its impact should not be limited to the situation
in which an individual suffers economic harm as a result of the monopoly
power exercised by the excluding association. 2 5 Exclusion from a professional
association may result in harm which is not measurable in economic terms.
An association's monopoly power in regulating and supervising professional
practice 26 deprives the excluded practitioner of the important right to par-
ticipate in decision-making concerning regulation of his occupation.- Because
this regulation may have a substantial effect on the individual's practice, his
exclusion appreciably diminishes the value of his license.2 The practitioner
can be compared to a person denied admission to a union which has a closed
shop arrangement with an employer. Usually courts will order that the union
either admit a qualified applicant or that the closed shop arrangement be dis-
regarded.29 However, under the latter alternative the worker earns a livelihood,
but is deprived of the right to participate in union policy making which might
materially affect the conditions of his employment. Thus, a sounder approach
in both the union and professional context is to compel admission into the
excluding organization.30
23. See, e.g., Note, 75 HARv. L. REv. 1186, 1193 (1961); Note, 15 RUTGsS L REv.
327, 356 (1961). The notewriters argued that if an association is compelled to admit all
practitioners this would result in lower standards for the profession in general, and would
damage the reputation of the society.
24. Note, 75 HARv. L. REv. 1186, 1198 (1961) ; Note, 15 RtoERs L REv. 327, 354
(1961).
25. While economic injury does provide a valid basis for intervention, there are
several problems in applying an economic test. It is not clear what degree of economic
harm is necessary to justify intervention. There are economic injuries, less serious than
total loss of ability to practice, which might deprive an excluded applicant of the ability
to practice successfully. Membership in the association may be necessary to obtain social
and professional contracts necessary for referral business and professional advancement;
access to publications, libraries, and meetings which help the professional keep abreast of
developments in his profession; or malpractice insurance necessary for practice. Moreover,
there may be instances where substantial economic injury is alleged but a court would not
be justified in intervening. Exclusion from a local Elks or country club may result in sub-
stantial economic injury. (This might occur when most of a town's business leaders belong
to the club and make it a practice to deal only with other members.) Yet, if a court vere
to intervene when an individual was excluded from such a club, all the values of private
association and group autonomy would be endangered.
26. For a description of these powers see text accompanying notes 37-39 inlra.
27. See note 43 infra and accompanying text.
28. See discussion in note 41 infra and accompanying text.
29. See James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 3-9 (1944).
30. Although only one court has adopted this approach in the area of union activity,
Thorman v. International Alliance of Theatrical, Stage Employees, 49 Cal. 2d 629, 320
P.2d 494 (1958), it has been advocated by many commentators. See, e.g., Summers, Tie
Right to Join a Union, 47 CoLuM. L. REV. 33, 73 (1947).
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This argument was advanced by the plaintiff in a recent exclusion case,
Salter v. Psychological Assn.3 1 Salter, a psychologist certified by New York,
claimed that the court should compel his admission because "the Association
was an arm of the state" or at the very least, exercised monopoly power over
his profession, and that the association's action harmed him substantially.0
Salter emphasized the non-economic interests that were jeopardized by ex-
clusion,83 chiefly his inability to be heard in the forum most concerned with
the regulation and development of the practice of psychology in New York.84
The court rejected Salter's petition on the grounds that he failed to prove
either that the association's actions were state action, or that the association
exerted monopolistic control over the profession.33 However, the court did
leave open the possibility that Salter's non-economic arguments might justify
judicial intervention if state action were established.30
31. 14 N.Y.2d 100, 198 N.E.2d 250, 248 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1964).
32. Brief for Appellant, pp. 10, 17, Salter v. Psychological Ass'n, siupra note 31.
33. He also alleged that he would suffer economic harm resulting from injury to
reputation and loss of prestige due to his exclusion from the psychological association. Id.
at 19, 27.
34. Id. at 15. Salter alleged that
[b]ecause of its size, power and position, the Association obtained the legislation
governing petitioner's profession and means of livelihood. It is performing the duties
of the statutory State Advisory Council by undertaking to construe and implement
that legislation . . . all of this having a direct impact on petitioner's professional
existence. And yet, as one certified under this legislation and governed by it, peti-
tioner is denied the right to have a voice. . . in the implementation and interpreta-
tion of the law and in any proposals for new legislation.
Ibid.
35. 14 N.Y2d at 105, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 870.
36. 14 N.Y2d at 104, 248 N.Y.S2d at 869, 870. Due to the peculiar fact situation
presented in this case the court was probably justified in reaching its decision. Not only
did Salter fail to satisfy the educational requirements for membership in the association,
but also these requirements were lower than those of the state certification standard. Salter
had received his certification through a "grandfather" clause in the certification statute,
which provided that individuals practicing in New York for twelve years prior to the
passage of the certification law need not meet the educational requirements, 14 N.Y.2d at
103, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 869. Furthermore, Salter was a successful practitioner and could not
show economic harm. Finally, as noted above, Salter failed to prove ties between the asso-
ciation and the government sufficient to constitute state action. 14 N.Y.2d at 105-06, 248
N.Y.S.2d at 870-71.
Salter's claims, however, were not entirely without merit. There was ample evidence
that he was a very competent psychologist. Brief for Appellant, at 3. He was at least
considered competent enough to merit state licensure, since the state statute required that
individuals without the requisite educational background prove their competency to a state
board of examiners. N.Y. EDUCATION LAw § 7601 (1956). Moreover, there were sig-
nificant ties, albeit informal ones, between the association and the state. It was primarily
through the efforts of the association that the state certification law had been passed, and
the legislature had worked closely with the association in drafting the statute. Brief for
Appellant, at 10. Eight of the seventeen members of the State Advisory Board were also
directors of the association. Id. at 11. The association itself recognized these connections
with the state by proclaiming itself the voice of all New York State psychologists and
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Actually, with regard to many professional associations, there exists suffi-
cient formal nexus between the state and the association to support a finding
of state action. If, then, the exclusion is unreasonable, the association's action
would violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. For
example, unlike the situation in the Salter case, extensive power over the
regulation of most professions has been given to licensing boards, which are
in turn formally controlled by a professional association. 37 Furthermore, in
many states, professional groups have been delegated the authority to accredit
professional schools.-a This power is particularly important in states where
licensure is restricted to graduates of accredited institutions.30 Finally, a num-
ber of states authorize professional societies to make up and grade the licensing
examination.4 ° In all of these instances, the association exercises a significant
degree of control over the individual practitioner and his manner of practice.'
Delegations of this nature have been defended on the grounds that:
They guarantee expert understanding of the problems faced by practi-
tioners in the occupation. Above all, they give the practitioners being
regulated a sense of participation in selecting their regulators and thus
ensure their close cooperation in maintaining high standards of practice.
It should be apparent then, that the most persuasive reason for reposing
state regulatory authority in a professional society - its responsiveness to
the members of the profession - is also the most persuasive argument for
enforcing the claim of duly licensed practitioners to admission to the associa-
claiming to be the organ through which the psychologist could have a voice in regulation
of the profession. Id. at 11, 12. Finally, the association had frequently made exceptions to
its general qualifications and admitted those with qualifications similar to Salter's, id. at
14, indicating that its standards were not absolute. Yet% in this instance, it refused to give
Salter a hearing. Ibid. These facts might justify a finding that the association's actions
were state action and that the society acted arbitrarily in excluding Salter.
37. In most states the licensing boards are either chosen directly by the professional
association or from a list of nominees submitted by the association. For a detailed break-
down of the methods by which these boards are chosen see CouNcm OF STATE GOVN-
muxrs, OccUPATiONAL LIcENsING LrasLAsi0 nT THE STATES at 88-90 (1952). For a
typical statute see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-93 (1958).
38. E.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 2869(b) (1961); MONT. REv. CODES § 66-1003(a)
(1947).
39. Ibid.
40. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants makes up and grades the
licensing exam in every state. (It has instituted a uniform test.) See, Penny, The American
Institute of CPAs - Past and Future, JoURNAL OF AccouNTAN Y at 33 (Jan. 1962).
Similar powers have been granted other professional associations. CouNCu. oF STATE Gov-
zmmars, op. cit. supra note 37, at 51.
41. These boards issue, suspend, and revoke licenses (and often establish the grounds
for these actions), enforce the licensing statute - even to the extent of evaluating the
work of licensees, establish license fees, and examine applicants for admission to the pro-
fession. They frequently determine ethical standards which may regulate how a professional
may obtain clients or what fees he may charge. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVEu rTS, op. cit.
supra note 37, at 40-47.
42. COUNCIL OF STATE GovERNmENs, op. cit. supra note 37, at 38.
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tion. The democratic process is best satisfied when those persons most directly
affected by the licensing and regulation of professions are accorded the fullest
right to participate in the decision-making process. 43 Since the state delegates
regulatory powers to a specific organization, any practitioner outside the
organization is silenced. Moreover, the public benefits when all viewpoints
within a particular profession are heard before an association exercising public
powers. Dissenting opinion should not be stifled by denial of admission to
applicants with unpopular views. In Falcone, for example, it would seem that
a major reason why the AMA denied Dr. Falcone admission was that he had
studied osteopathy, a science abhorred by the Association. 44 Thus, while secur-
ing the rights of qualified practitioners seeking admission to professional
associations, the court protects also the broader public interest in having a
fully representative professional forum.
Judicial intervention, then, seems justified in exclusion cases involving
associations to which the state has formally delegated regulatory authority.
(The majority of professional organizations probably fall within this class,)
4
The argument for intervention, of course, may seem weaker when no formal
delegation of authority exists. But, informal ties between the association and
the state may be just as significant as those established by legislative enact-
ment. Even in the absence of formal delegation, a strong society may exercise
effective regulatory power over a profession. A state legislature, faced with
the need to enact legislation in a short period, cannot consider extensively
varying professional viewpoints concerning regulation of the profession. In-
stead, the legislature relies heavily upon the associations, under the assump-
tion that internal differences among members of the profession have been
resolved within the association itself. Therefore, an association may have
been primarily responsible for drafting and amending the state's licensing
statute;46 or, as a matter of practice, the state licensing board may be coin-
posed of the association's officers.47 In such a situation the harm to the pro-
43. See Summers, supra note 2, at 12, 13. In fact, our entire system of government is
based on the right of participation in governmental decision - either directly or through
elected representatives. It is not a long jump from this premise to the conclusion that there
should be a right to participate in decisions of private groups, when, in effect, these groups
have authority to make decisions as a result of a delegation of governmental power.
44. There is at present a trend toward absorption of osteopaths into the AMA.
Note, The American Medical Association, supra note 1, at 966-67. Thus the cleavage be-
tveen osteopaths and the AMA may be disappearing. However, in local societies the breach
may still be significant. Ideology also seemed to be the major reason Salter was excluded.
According to several members of the profession, Salter espoused an approach to psychology
repugnant to the majority of the Psychological Association.
45. COUNcIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, op. cit. supra note 37, at 88-90.
46. See discussion supra note 36. COUNCIL oF STATE GOVERNMENTS, op. Cii, si[pra note
37, at 57.
47. See discussion supra note 36. Power in professional associations tends to be cen-
tered in relatively few hands, and this may be reflected in the composition of licensing boards.
For a general discussion of the tendency towards oligarchies see Note, The American
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fessional resulting from exclusion by the association is just as substantial
as the harm caused by exclusion from an association formally performing
state functions. The type of economic injury considered in Falcone may readily
result from exclusion by either type of association. Also, access to effective
decisional arenas may be just as completely blocked in either situation.
For these reasons the courts should intervene in exclusion disputes when
the association has established substantial informal ties with the state, although
there has been no formal delegation4 In analogous areas the courts have
recognized that private associations may exercise public power and thus
should be prohibited from taking arbitrary or unconstitutional action. For
example, in the case of Terry v. Adams,4 9 the Supreme Court compelled ad-
mission of Negroes into a private association which in reality controlled a
state's electoral process. And in Marsh v. Alabama ro the Court held that a
company town, though a private body, had assumed public characteristics and
should be held to the same constitutional standards as government itself.5'
Similarly, in the area of professional regulation, a clear de facto exercise of
regulatory power by the association should justify its being treated in the same
manner as an association formally performing governmental functions. Alter-
natively, the economic monopoly position of the association might justify a
state court's intervention.
Once a decision has been made to intervene in an exclusion dispute, a court
must determine what standards it should apply in testing the validity of the
association's action. This problem is seen by many commentators as the most
serious obstacle to judicial intervention in exclusion disputes. They argue
that a court, lacking expertise, cannot, and therefore should not, substitute
its judgment for that of the association.52
It is submitted, however, that certification or licensure by the state provides
a workable standard of review. When an applicant has been certified or li-
censed by the state there should be a presumption that the applicant is qualified
for admission to the professional association. This rule follows the logical
implications of the Falcone decision. Although the Falcone court claimed it
was not evaluating standards, it did exactly that in saying that the society's
rules had "no relation to the advancement of medical science or the evaluation
Medical Association, supra note 1; Kahn-Freund, Trade Union Democracy and the Law,
22 OHIO ST. L.J. 4 (1961).
48. Courts would have to proceed on a case by case basis in determining vhether an
association was de facto a quasi-public body. The plaintiff would have the burden of prov-
ing that the association was performing functions supposedly performed by the state. See
supra notes 46, 47 for two factors a court should consider. See also Lewis, The Meaning
of State Action, 60 CoLum. L. REV. 1083 (1960).
49. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
50. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
51. Id. at 506-07.
52. See note 23 supra.
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of professional standards. ' '5 3 In effect, the court said that the state of New
Jersey found Dr. Falcone qualified, and therefore any contrary finding by
the medical society was unacceptable. Making state licensure prima facie
evidence of qualification for membership in a professional association places
upon the association the burden of proving that a particular applicant should
be excluded. The society would have to demonstrate that although the appli-
cant had a license his admission was not in the public interest.tr Absent a
clear and convincing showing, a court should accept the fact of licensure as
sufficient evidence of qualification and order the applicant admitted to the
association.
The standard based on state licensure is clear-cut, objective and readily
applicable in most cases. It minimizes the need for courts to make technical
or policy determinations concerning professional qualifications. Also, it pro-
tects the right of the individual practitioner without sacrificing high standards
of professional practice, since every applicant will have been judged qualified
by a state board of examiners.55 Moreover, the important role of professional
associations in raising the ethical (as opposed to educational) standards of the
profession will not be affected by applying this standard. And when an asso-
ciation believes that the state educational or competence qualifications are too
low, it can lobby to get them raised. In the past the associations have had great
success in convincing the states to impose stricter licensing laws.60 Finally,
adoption of the standard proposed in this Note will prevent the professional
association from using its power of exclusion to form an economic cartel. Fre-
53. 34 N.J. at 598, 170 A.2d at 800. This was the standard suggested by the lower
court. 62 N.J. Super. at 202, 162 A.2d at 333.
54. The association would have to show that, although the applicant was licensed, he
had violated ethical standards applicable to a member of the entire profession, or had
practiced in a manner sufficient to warrant delicensure. Thus if the applicant lost a mal-
practice suit, advertised in a manner contrary to professional standards, or was guilty of
other professional misconduct, the association might justifiably exclude him. Basically, tills
eliminates qualifications based on arbitrary factors such as race or political ideology, and
qualifications based on educational background - since the state educational standard Is
determinative. However, it is possible that in rare cases an association will be able to show
that the state's educational requirements are so low that the association had to have higher
standards in order to insure the public of competent professional service.
55. Generally, professional associations accept state licensure as sufficient evidence of
qualification. Occasionally, different classes of membership will be created, based on the
number of years of practical experience, but the rights of all members will not vary slignifi-
cantly. See, By-Laws, American Pharmaceutical Association, Art. II § 1; By-Laws,
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Art. II § 2; By-Laws, American
Dental Association, Chap. I § 20. Very few associations have higher educational require-
ments.
56. The fact that the impetus for licensing legislation generally comes from occupa-
tional associations themselves, and the success of these associations in prompting the pas-
sage of this type of legislation has been noted by many commentators. See, e.g., Jaffe, Law
Making by Private Groups, 51 HAnv. L. REv. 201, 229-30 (1937); COUNCIL oF STATE
GOVERNMENTS, op. cit. supra note 37, at 57; Grant, The Gild Returns to America I, 4
J. oF PoLTIcs 303, 316-17 (1942).
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quently, associations have adopted restrictive qualifications only to further their
economic interests.57
Judicial intervention in exclusion cases might result in some disharmony
within the affected association. Actually, there is no reason to expect that
there will be very many cases in which the courts will be called upon to
enforce admission, since most applicants do not have any particular difficulty
in gaining entrance to professional associations. However, there will always
be a few individuals excluded because of race, unpopular professional or poli-
tical views, or because of other unreasonable restraints imposed by the associ-
ation. In these situations, judicial intervention is justified. The resulting in-
terference with private associations will be both insignificant and infrequent.
For the most part private ordering will not be supplanted by judicial fiat, and
the societies will be left a free hand in the management of their affairs.
ADDENDUM
Since this Note went to press, a case very much in point was decided by
the New York Supreme Court. In Kurk v. Quecnes County Mcdical Sodcety,
Inc.,58 the court compelled a medical society to admit an excluded practitioner.
57. Numerous commentators have noted the cartelizing efforts of these associations.
See, e.g., Grant, supra note 56, at 316-17; Gilb, Self-Regulating Professions and the Public
Welfare - A Case Study of the California Bar (unpublished thesis, Radcliffe, 1956);
Note, The American Medical Association, Power, Purpose, and Politics in Organized
Medichie, 63 YA.x L.J. 938, 947 (1954). Often this is accomplished by encouraging the
passage of licensing legislation. See, CouxcI. oF STATE GOwmatENTs, op. cit. Supra note
37, at 57. Sometimes the methods are less subtle. The attempts of the AMA to destroy
group health plans and to regulate fees are two examples. See Group Health Co-op v.
County Medical Soey, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 237 P.2d 737 (1951); Tatkin v. Superior Court,
160 Cal. App. 2d 745, 326 P2d 201 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958). In a related context see Brazier,
The Ohio Architects' Guild, CAsEs i STATE Alm LocAL Govm "arm at 41 (Frost ed.
1961).
When a private association is in a position to function as a cartel, a court should be
even more willing to see that it exercises its power consonant with public policy. Such an
attitude was expressed by the Supreme Court in Silver v. Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341
(1963), in which the stock exchange was found to be subject to the Sherman Act. The
Court stated:
The exchanges are by their nature bodies with a limited number of members...
This limited-entry feature of exchanges led historically to their being treated by
courts as private dubs, ... and to their being given great latitude in disciplining
errant members .... As exchanges became a more and more important element in
our Nation's economic. . . system, however, the private-dub analogy became in-
creasingly inapposite and the ungoverned self-regulation became more and more
obviously inadequate....
Id. at 350-51.
Because of this change in character, the Court held that the stock exchange vas
covered by the Sherman Act, and that it could not arbitrarily exclude an individual from
use of its services. Since the Sherman Act is not applicable to professional associations,
see supra note 13, a court must find other ways of checking the actions of these groups.
58. Index No. 2796165, New York Supreme Court, Queens County, June 10, 1965
(Shapiro, J.). (Unreported opinion.)
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The facts were strikingly similar to those of the Falcone case; the plaintiff,
though licensed to practice medicine, had been denied admission because lie
had received his degree from a college of osteopathy. The opinion in Kurrk
reflects substantial accord with the principles suggested in this Note. The
court placed considerable reliance upon the rationale of the Falcone decision,
that membership in the medical association is an economic necessity. But the
court went further, and indicated that there are constitutional reasons which
prohibited the society - "which is in many ways an arm of the state" - from
excluding a licensed practitioner :60
Looking at the matter realistically, such an exclusion amounts to a cur-
tailment of the grant which a doctor has received from this state to prac-
tice his profession in uninhibited form. Any rule or regulation of a pro-
fessional society designed or calculated to effect such a purpose must be
scrutinized with utmost care to see whether it is not arbitrary and un-
reasonable and whether in its relationship to the petitioner it does not
violate his right to the equal protection and due process clauses of the
14th amendment of the United States Constitution. . . . Not even an
honestly held belief that such exclusionary rules are in the public interest
warrant the society in adopting and enforcing them if they are violative
of the petitioner's constitutional rights.
Finally, the court indicated that professional associations must in general ac-
cept the fact of state licensure as the standard of admission:
[The Medical Society] may not constitute itself a super agency to sit in
judgment upon and by its own regulations overrule and supersede the re- .
quirements laid down by the regular and legally constituted governmental
agencies, thereby arrogating to itself the power to decide who is to be
permitted to engage in the unlimited general practice of medicine.0 1
59. See text accompanying notes 14-25 supra. As in Falcone, Dr. Kurk was denied
hospital privileges as a result of exclusion from the medical society.
60. See notes 37-48 supra and accompanying text.
61. See text accompanying notes 53-57 supra.
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